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Abstract
This paper is a critique of version three of Joonmo Kim’s paper enti-
tled “P 6= NP by Modus Tollens.” After summarizing Kim’s proof, we
note that the logic that Kim uses is inconsistent, which provides evidence
that the proof is invalid. To show this, we will consider two reasonable
interpretations of Kim’s definitions, and show that “P 6= NP” does not
seem to follow in an obvious way using any of them.
1 Introduction
The abstract of Kim’s paper [2] is as follows:
An artificially designed Turing Machine algorithmMo generates the
instances of the satisfiability problem, and check their satisfiability.
Under the assumption P = NP, we show that Mo has a certain
property, which, without the assumption, Mo does not have. This
leads to P 6= NP by modus tollens.
In this paper we will critique Kim’s proof that P 6= NP, a proof that claims
to solve the famous P vs. NP problem, widely agreed to be the most important
unsolved problem in computer science. We will begin by outlining Kim’s paper
in detail. Then we will examine several problems with his paper, including the
many ambiguous definitions, wordings, and explanations throughout his paper.
We will address both of the possible interpretations of his most ambiguous
definition, and describe how either interpretation arrives at a contradiction.
Finally, we provide a comment on the invalidity of the final commentary of
Kim’s paper.
2 Kim’s argument
Most of the arguments in Kim’s paper are not rigorous, some constructions are
not shown, his definitions are not precise, and we believe his paper contains
many notational mistakes. For this reason, this section will restate his paper in
detail as we understand it so that it may be refuted rigorously.
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2.1 Cook-Levin theorem
By the Cook-Levin theorem, we can construct a series of Boolean clauses based
on the action of any arbitrary Turing machine on a given input x, such that
the series of clauses is satisfiable if and only if it accepts x. Together, Kim calls
this unit of clauses c. In the proof of this theorem given by Garey and Johnson,
these Boolean clauses in c are grouped into G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, and G6 by the
different parts of the computation that they enforce. One group of particular
interest to Kim is G4, which enforces that “at time 0, the computation is in
the initial configuration of its checking stage for input x” [1]. The rest of the
groups of clauses, G1, G2, G3, G5, and G6, are each concerned with the run of
the machine, its transitions, and that it ends at a final state [1].
For a given c, he lets cx, what he calls the “input-part,” be G4, the group
that is concerned with asserting the initial configuration. He lets cr , the “run-
part,” be the rest of the clauses, those concerned with the run of the machine.
2.2 Construction of M
Definition: An accepting computation of a Turing machine T on input y is
a finite sequence of configurations and transitions of T (starting at the initial
state of T and with y on its tape) that ends in an accepting state of T .
Kim proposes a Turing machine algorithm M, which has in its code a finite list
c1, c2, ..., cn of Boolean formulas, each which have been encoded from arbitrary
accepting computations from arbitrary Turing machines, using the Cook-Levin
construction described above. For each cj in this list, we can strip its “input-
part” to obtain the list of “run-parts” cr
1
, cr
2
, ..., crn. Call this list of “run-parts”
from arbitrary machines Cr
M
.
Kim notes that we can construct countably many M’s, M1,M2,M3, ...,Mi,
where each Mi includes in its program code the list of Boolean formulas C
r
Mi
,
as described above. Kim defines the behavior of a given Mi as follows.
Mi = “On input y:
1. Using the Cook-Levin construction, compute the Boolean clause
cy (i.e., G4, the clause that enforces the initial machine state of
Mi and the placement of input y on its tape.)
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2. For each crj ∈ C
r
Mi
:
(a) Concatenate crj with c
y to form cj .
(b) Give cj to a SAT -solver module, and increment a counter if
it returns that cj is satisfiable (i.e., if it is a valid accepting
computation with input y.)
3. Accept if the number accumulated by the counter is odd.”
Let CMi,y be the list of each c that appears in the run of Mi on input y. More
formally, CMi,y = c1, c2, ..., cn such that cj = (c
y ∧ crj), where c
r
j ∈ C
r
Mi
.
2.3 Defining Mo
Kim introduces the idea of a particular transition table of a Turing machine,
which he says is a transition table that “may produce an accepting computation
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by running on a Turing Machine” [2]. He observes that “each of all accepting
computations may have its particular transition table, i.e., the table can be built
by collecting all the distinguished transitions from the computation, where we
know that a computation is a sequence of the transitions of configurations of a
Turing Machine” [2].
Kim then proposes the machineMo ∈ {M1,M2, ...,Mi} such that, for some
input y, there exists a co ∈ CMo,y that describes an accepting computation on
input y (call this accepting computation âcco) for which there exists a particular
transition table t which is also a particular transition table for the accepting
computation of the run of Mo on y (call this âcMo .) Note, rather importantly,
that âcco and âcMo are both accepting computations with respect to input y.
2.4 “P 6= NP”
Definition: [2] A particular transition table t is Dsat if it “deterministically
describes Mo’s transitions and the SAT-solver module in Mo runs determinis-
tically in a poly-time for the length of c.”
Kim’s proof of P 6= NP is as follows.
P1: P = NP,
P2: M
o exists,
P3: there exists t, which is Dsat.
By modus tollens, (P1 ⇒ (P2 ⇒ P3)) ∧ (¬(P2 ⇒ P3)) may conclude
¬P1. [2]
He argues that P1 ⇒ (P2 ⇒ P3) because, if such an M
o exists, by definition
a t must exist, and that t is Dsat, because if P = NP, the SAT -solver module
(which is known to be NP-complete) would run in deterministic polynomial
time.
This argument is sufficient to show that P1 ⇒ (P2 ⇒ P3). All Kim must
show now is that P2 ⇒ P3 results in a contradiction, thus showing ¬(P2 ⇒ P3),
and proving by modus tollens ¬P1. But first, he argues (unnecessarily) that P2
is true. And in fact, he is actually arguing that P2 ∧ P3 is true. The following
argument [2], while irrelevant, is shown for completeness.
We can show that P2 is true, as follows. For any chosen c
o, build
two non-deterministic particular transition tables for âcMo and âcco
separately, and then merge the two so that one of the two compu-
tations can be chosen selectively from the starting state during the
run. Mo may exist by this t, which is NDsat.
Kim provides very little to explain precisely what this “merging process”
of tables is. Below is a construction of what we assume his merging process to
be. Consider transition tables δM and δM ′ for machinesM andM
′ respectively:
(For brevity, head movements and writes to the tape are omitted; only state transitions
are shown.)
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δM a b · · ·
q0 qw qx
q1 qy qz
...
. . .
δM ′ a
′ b′ · · ·
q′
0
q′w q
′
x
q′1 q
′
y q
′
z
...
. . .
Using δM and δM ′ , we can produce the non-deterministic particular transition
table δM,M ′ that “describes,” or that can “produce” both âcM and âcM ′ , as
generated by δM,M ′ , for arbitrary input y:
δM,M ′ ǫ a b · · · a
′ b′ · · ·
qstart {q0, q′0} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
q0 ∅ {qw} {qx} ∅ ∅
q1 ∅ {qy} {qz} ∅ ∅
...
. . .
q′
0
∅ ∅ ∅ {q′w} {q
′
x}
q′1 ∅ ∅ ∅ {q
′
y} {q
′
z}
...
. . .
2.5 Contradiction argument
Kim’s proof by contradiction to prove ¬(P2 ⇒ P3) is as follows. By way of
contradiction, he assumes (P2 ⇒ P3) to be true, i.e., that “if M
o exists then
there exists t, which is a Dsat particular transition table for both âcMo and
âcco” [2]. He then claims that, since the same transition table t can generate
both âcMo and âcco , which share the same input y, “it is concluded that both
âcMo and âcco are exactly the same computation, i.e., all the transitions of the
configurations of âcMo and those of âcco are exactly the same” [2].
Now, he lets i be the number of transitions between configurations in âcMo ,
j the number of clauses of co, and k the number of transitions between config-
urations in âcco .
He argues that during the run of Mo on input y, all the clauses of co will
have to be loaded on the tape of Mo, as well as the clauses of all other c’s
∈ CMo,y, so i > j. And, since each transition of an accepting computation is
described by more than one clause [1], we conclude j > k, and thus i > j > k.
However, Kim argues that a contradiction arises here. The previous conclu-
sion that âcMo and âcco are exactly the same computation would imply that
i = k, which contradicts i > j > k. Thus, he claims ¬(P2 ⇒ P3).
3 Critique
During our analysis of his argument, we identified several flaws in Kim’s proof
which we critique here in detail.
3.1 Invalidity of logical argument
Kim’s argument centers around the definition of Dsat, as well as this fact: if
P = NP then the particular transition table that is implied by Mo’s existence
is Dsat. Kim then attempts to arrive at a contradiction by showing that such a
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particular transition table cannot exist. However, in his proof by contradiction,
he does not use the fact that t is Dsat, so the assumption (that if there exists
an Mo then there exists a t that is Dsat) is equivalent to (M
o exists) ⇒ (t
exists). Note that, by definition, Mo exists if and only if t exists. Therefore,
Kim cannot possibly prove that (Mo exists) ⇒ (t exists) is false. This fact
provides evidence that his proof must be invalid, which we will presently show.
3.2 Ambiguities with accepting computations and partic-
ular transition tables
An error arises in Kim’s final contradiction that P2 does not imply P3, namely
that since Mo exists, a Dsat particular transition table of both âcco and âcMo
exists. Kim argues that the existence of this particular transition table implies
that âcco and âcMo are equivalent accepting computations.
Here, Kim’s definition of an accepting computation is of crucial importance.
Michael Sipser [3] offers the following definition of an accepting computation
history:
Let M be a Turing machine and w an input string. An accepting
computation history for M on w is a sequence of configurations,
C1, C2, ..., Cl, where C1 is the start configuration of M on w, Cl is
an accepting configuration of M , and each Ci legally follows from
Ci−1 according to the rules of M . (Emphasis added.)
Although Sipser refers to an accepting computation history, we infer from Kim’s
own paper that this definition is equivalent to simply accepting computation:
“...we know that a computation is a sequence of the transitions of config-
urations of a Turing Machine” (emphasis added) [2].
Note that Sipser’s definition suggests, as would common intuition, that an
accepting computation relies on the transition table of the given machine run-
ning it. However, Kim is vague in describing how particular transition tables
and accepting computations relate. One could interpret it in one of two ways.
Either,
1. An accepting computation is produced by a given Turing machine and its
own transition table.
2. An accepting computation can be produced by a given particular transi-
tion table, not necessarily that of the original machine, that can describe
each transition between configurations.
We believe that an error arises when Kim operates under the first interpreta-
tion for his claim that i > j > k, and the second for the i = k claim. To
produce a consistent and coherent proof, the paper can only operate under one
interpretation. In the following sections, we will address both interpretations
independently and show that under either one, his contradiction is invalid.
3.2.1 First interpretation
By this interpretation, âcMo and âcco are accepting computations from different
Turing machines entirely, which behave in very different ways. Mo, on input y,
concatenates its own cy with each of the Boolean formulas in Cr
Mo
, then runs
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a SAT -solver module on each c, counting the c’s that are accepted. On the
other hand, each âcc is just an arbitrary accepting computation of some Turing
machine M on an input y. Under this interpretation, it is not obvious that any
âcMo is equivalent to any âcco . The argument that Kim gives as proof that some
âcMo is equivalent to some âcco is that one can create a particular transition
table that is a transition table for both âcMo and âcco . However, the “merging”
technique that Kim uses to show that any t can be made from two transition
tables can be shown to be invalid.
This technique produces a new transition table, which contains new states (as
it must include the set of states from both machines) and possibly new alphabet
characters. Thus, it cannot be said that the new particular transition table is
the same transition function as either original machine, or even a “compatible”
one, since it operates on a set of states that is different from the machine’s
original set of states, and would thereby be malformed.
Therefore, under this interpretation, Kim’s argument that i = k follows from
there existing some t which can produce âcMo and âcco is invalid, since âcMo
and âcco are computations produced by transition tables necessarily different
from their original machines, and thus i > j > k is correct, and there is no
inconsistency.
3.2.2 Second interpretation
In the second interpretation, we will assume that accepting computations can
be produced by the particular transition table t. Then we may conclude that
since t is a particular transition table for âcMo and âcco , then âcMo and âcco are
equivalent as accepting computations produced by a particular transi-
tion table for some input y. Note that these accepting computations are not
necessarily the same as the accepting computations produced by their respective
Turing machines’ transition tables. So, when Kim concludes that the number
of transitions in âcMo must be larger than the number of transitions in âcco as
a contradiction, he is no longer comparing the same accepting computations, so
that fact is not contradictory. Given the nature of Mo and co, i > j > k does
not follow, because âcMo and âcco are indeed the same computations produced
by t, and analysis based on their original respective machines does not apply.
3.3 Comment on Kim’s “commentary”
At the end of his paper, Kim verifies that his given proof could not also be used
to prove that P = NP. This verification is very brief and relies heavily on the
assumption that the proof that his paper presents makes accurate assumptions
and logical inferences. It is essentially a retelling of his argument with reversed
assumptions and conclusions. Clearly, assuming that his original proof is correct,
it can be used to refute the possibility of proving the opposite statement, but it
does not tell us anything about the validity of the original proof.
4 Conclusion
From our interpretation of Kim’s paper, the main problems stem from a severe
lack of rigor, numerous misunderstandings, and occasional inconsistencies in his
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definitions. In his main argument, he derives a contradiction from the properties
of a Turing machine and the Dsat property of a particular transition table. In
our main argument, we point out that there is an inconsistency here that renders
the main proposition of his supposed contradiction invalid in the two possible
interpretations of his definition regarding accepting computation.
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Notes
1The Garey and Johnson construction that Kim uses for the SAT reduction, even for
group G4, is reliant on a machine so that its initial state can be encoded: “at time 0, the
computation is in the initial configuration of its checking stage for input x” [1].
However, Kim does not specify which machine to use in this construction of cy. So that
the machine code for Mi is well defined, we use Mi itself as the machine used in the c
y
construction, but the following argument will show that in fact the choice of machine does not
matter. (And since Garey and Johnson’s construction is not the only conceivable construction
that maps machine actions to clauses (with separate “input” and “run” parts) as per the
Cook-Levin theorem, our proof is independent of the details of that specific construction.)
Suppose that a given Boolean formula cy was constructed from machine M on input y,
and that an arbitrary Boolean formula cr was constructed from machine Mr .
• If the only relevant information in cy, even being constructed from M specifically, is
the placement of y on the tape (i.e., that the construction encodes all initial states for
all machines the same way), then indeed concatenating cr from Mr will produce the
same c that the construction would produce for Mr on input y.
• If the information in cy uses specific elements of M , like M ’s start state, it is still
possible that the clauses of cr are “compatible” with cy (i.e., the construction produces
the same cy’s for both M on input y and Mr on input y), and so it is possible that
(cy ∧ cr) is satisfiable.
• If the information in cy is absolutely specific to M and is entirely “incompatible” with
any other machine Boolean encodings, then no c will be satisfiable, meaning that no âcc
and thus no co (explained in Section 2.3) can exist. This would make the antecedent
in (P2 ⇒ P3) in Section 2.4 false, which would make the statement true, and thus the
logical model is valid regardless of the truth value of P1 (P = NP.)
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